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Economic Prospects for Small Island Economies, 
Particularly in the South Pacific, in a Globalising World 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
After pointing out that small island economies are diverse in their economic situations and in 
their ability to benefit from globalisation, this article examines the actual situation of South 
Pacific island countries.  It takes into account their size and its diversity; variations in their 
involvement in international trade; their geographic, ethnic and cultural differences; their 
international political associations; and differences in their degree of economic development.  
All of these factors, as well as their common attributes, influence the prospects of small 
Pacific Island countries for benefiting from economic globalisation.  The question of whether 
the MIRAB characterisation of South Pacific Island Economies continues to be relevant is 
explored given that there has been increasing global support for the notion that nations should 
mainly rely on economic liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation for their economic 
development and become less aid dependent.  Furthermore, the extent to which economic 
globalisation can be embraced to further the sustainable development of Pacific island 
countries is discussed. 
 
 
Economic Prospects for Small Island Economies, 
Particularly in the South Pacific, in a Globalising World 
 
1. Introduction  
Small island nations are extremely varied in their nature and location and this means that 
their prospects for gaining from globalisation can be very different.  For example, island 
nations, such as Singapore and semi-independent Hong Kong, are much better placed than 
small Pacific island nations, such as Tuvalu and Niue, to benefit from economic globalisation.  
Singapore is well placed in relation to the Asian market and is an important hub in trade and 
communication routes, and Hong Kong has close connections with the Chinese mainland.  By 
contrast, Tuvalu and Niue have poor and expensive international transport connections and 
are not appended to or near any major economies. 
 
Remote small island nations or economies, such as those in the South Pacific and nearby ones, 
suffer considerable economic disadvantages that cannot be eliminated by most processes 
involved in globalisation, even though some globalisation processes can be of economic 
benefit to them. 
 
This may be one of the reasons why small island nations are singled out for special mention 
in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations.  Under Goal 8, the 
development of global partnership for development, Target 14 is said to be “to address the 
special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states (through the 
Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States 
and the outcome of the 22nd special session of the General Assembly” (World Bank, 2004, 
p.xxii). 
 
Remote small island economies experience very high costs in the transport of goods.  Their 
costs of importing and exporting goods are further increased because of extended periods 
required for storing their imports and exports because of the infrequency of their shipping and 
air transport.  Scale economies also are often lost in international transport because smaller 
sized vessels are more economic than the large vessels which ply between major economies.  
Furthermore, market competition is frequently lacking in international transport to remote 
island communities so that monopoly charges may apply to such transport.  Economies of 
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scale in relation to the volume of trade often result in it being uneconomic for more than one 
carrier (or a couple at most) to service an international transport route for such small nations. 
 
Within these economies themselves, there also tends to be business concentration in the 
economic distribution of imports and also in many of their industries.  Dimou (2007 
forthcoming) has documented this in relation to the distribution retail goods in Reunion 
Island in the Indian Ocean.  Once again the small markets involved in relation to scale 
economies provide barriers to entry of all but a few firms.  A similar position can arise in 
relation to exports so that local sellers are faced with a monopsony, or a near monopsony, in 
selling their produce to exporting firms.  Natural market conditions result in a high degree of 
imperfect competition in these small economies, and economic globalisation is powerless to 
overcome such barriers to international trade. 
 
The ability of small island nations to benefit from economic globalisation (or be injured by it) 
can vary considerably depending upon their nature.  Therefore, this article will provide 
information on the heterogeneity of South Pacific island economies, outline their 
international connections and highlight their global economic dependence.  It will indicate 
implications for them of growing globalisation, will examine their conception as MIRAB 
economies, and will consider changes in the relevance of this concept with growing 
globalisation.  In turn, this will lead on to a discussion of the implications of growing 
globalisation for the sustainable development of these economies. 
 
2.  The Heterogeneity of South Pacific Island Economies and Neighbouring Island 
Economies. 
2.1  Diversity of Size 
Table 1 indicates that South Pacific Island nations differ greatly in their land area, levels of 
population, population density, and size of their economies as measured by the magnitude of 
their GDP.  The land mass of the island economies or nations listed range from those with 
extremely small areas such as Tokelau, Nauru and Tuvalu, to those with substantial areas, 
such as Papua New Guinea (PNG) which has the largest land area, followed by the Solomon 
Islands, New Caledonia and not far behind, Fiji.  Population densities vary from relatively 
low levels in Niue , New Caledonia, PNG and the Solomon Islands to very high levels, as in 
Nauru, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands. 
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Table 1: Basic socioeconomic attributes of South Pacific Island countries for 2005 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Country Land Mass 
(sq km) 
Population Pop Density 
(per sq km) 
GDP 
(US$m) 
GDP/capita 
(US$m) 
American Samoa 199 57794 
(2006 est) 
290.4 n/a n/a 
Cook Islands 240 12388 51.6 183.2 8567 
Fiji 18300 905949 49.5 3000 3514 
French Polynesia 4000 252900 
(2005) 
63.2 3800 
(2002) 
15697 
(2002) 
Kiribati 811 103092 
(2005) 
127.1 63 
(2004) 
690 
(2004) 
Marshall Islands 181 59071 
(2005) 
326.4 113.2 
(2003) 
1925 
(2003) 
Micronesia 
Federation 
702 108000 
(2004) 
153.8 214.5 
(2004) 
1986 
(2004) 
Nauru 21 13048 
(2005) 
621.3 46 
(2003) 
3555 
(2003) 
New Caledonia 18500 20000 10.8 n/a n/a 
Niue 260 2166 
(2005) 
8.3 10 
(2003) 
6008 
(2003) 
Palau 458 20891 45.6 144.7 6925 
Papua New Guinea 463000 5900000 12.7 4000 666 
Samoa 2944 20000 67.9 336 1832 
Solomon Islands 28900 500000 17.3 288 598 
Tokelau 10 1392 
(2006 est) 
139.2 n/a n/a 
Tonga 748 112422 150.3 219 2142 
Tuvalu 26 11636 
(2005) 
447.5 15 
(2002) 
1374 
(2002) 
Vanuatu 12200 20000 16.4 332 1530 
 
Sources: Asian Development Bank, Country Reports, Key Indicators (www.adb.org), accessed July 2006.   
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Australia, Country Information.  
(www.dfat.gov.au/geo/), accessed July 2006 
 
The size of market of the selected economies as indicated by the size of their GDP varies 
from extremely low levels as in Niue and Tuvalu to sizeable levels as in the case of PNG, 
French Polynesia and Fiji.  If the level of GDP per capita of the selected entities is used a s a 
pointer to spending power of individuals, this is also found to be highly variable.  Figures for 
the Solomon Islands and PNG are very low.  That for American Samoa is about 10 times 
higher than in the Solomon Islands and PNG, for the Cook Islands around 13 times higher 
and for French Polynesia about 24 times higher. 
 
3 
2.2  Involvement in international trade and exchange – substantial variation 
Again, South Pacific Island Nations and their near neighbouring island countries are found to 
be very diverse in terms of their involvement in international exchange.  (See Table 2).  Their 
exports as a percentage of their GDP range from levels as low as 0.9% in the case of Tuvalu 
and 1.1% in the case of Niue to levels as high as 47.8% and 35.1% for PNG and the Solomon 
Islands respectively.  Fiji has an intermediate value of 23.3%.  The majority of countries 
listed in Table 2 have an export to GDP ratio of less than 10%. 
 
Table 2: Exports, imports, trade balances and current account balances of Pacific 
Island countries as a percentage of their GDP for the years indicated. 
Country Goods Exports 
%GDP 
Goods Imports 
%GDP 
Trade 
Balance 
%GDP 
Current a/c 
balance 
%GDP 
Cook Islands 4.5 
(2003) 
46.7 
(2003) 
-44.6 
(2003) 
9.4 
(2004) 
Fiji 23.3 
(2004) 
41.9 
(2004) 
-18.5 
(2004) 
-1.3 
(2004) 
Kiribati 9.7 
(2003) 
98.9 
(2003) 
-89.2 
(2003) 
-17.2 
(2003) 
Marshall Is. 8.4 
(2001) 
61 
(2001) 
-52.6 
(2001) 
14.5 
(2001) 
Micronesia 8.8 
(2002) 
45.3 
(2002) 
-36.4 
(2002) 
4.6 
(2002) 
Nauru 7.9 
(2003) 
71 
(2002) 
-42.1 
(2002) 
-20.5 
(2002) 
Palau 10 
(2002) 
78.8 
(2002) 
-68.8 
(2002) 
-17.2 
(2004) 
PNG 47.8 
(2002) 
31.4 
(2002) 
16.4 
(2002) 
2.1 
(2004) 
Samoa 3.2 
(2004) 
45 
(2004) 
-41.9 
(2004) 
2.9 
(2004) 
Solomon Is. 35.1 
(2003) 
33.1 
(2003) 
2 
(2003) 
12.8 
(2004) 
Tonga 10.4 
(2003) 
44.1 
(2003) 
-33.6 
(2003) 
4 
(2004) 
Tuvalu 0.9 
(2002) 
65.1 
(1995) 
-62.9 
(1995) 
4.7 
(1995) 
Vanuatu 9.6 
(2003) 
33 
(2003) 
-23.4 
(2003) 
-9.5 
(2004) 
 
Sources: Asian Development Bank, Country Reports, Key Indicators (www.adb.org), accessed July 2006. 
 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Australia, Country Information. 
(www.dfat.gov.au/geo/), accessed July 2006. 
 
Low export to GDP ratios are indicative of serious obstacles to international trade of which 
the high level of transport costs is one of the most serious problems for many of those 
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economies.  It can also be observed from the figures in Tables 1 and 2 that there is not a close 
positive correlation between the export to GDP ratios of these countries and the level of their 
GDP per head.  For example, both PNG and the Solomon Islands have high export ratios but 
very low levels of GDP per capita.  Thus greater involvement in the global economy via 
greater export intensity is not in itself the key to higher levels of income in these Pacific 
island countries.  
 
For nearly all of these Pacific Island countries, their imports are well in excess of their 
exports (see Table 2).  In some cases, this adds to their international transport costs  because 
shipping often lacks back freight. 
 
The trade deficits of Pacific island countries are financed in a variety of ways.  Sources of 
finance include remittances from Pacific islanders living and working abroad, inbound 
tourism, foreign aid, and in some cases, royalties paid by distant water fishing nations for 
rights to catch fish (mainly tuna) in their exclusive economic zones; and for some, returns on 
their capital funds invested abroad are important.  The relative importance of these sources of 
finance vary by country.  For example, Tuvalu and Kiribati depend heavily on returns from 
their capital funds invested mainly abroad and from remittances from their merchant sailors 
working on foreign vessels.  The capital funds of the micro-states of Kiribati and Tuvalu were 
established when they became independent of their former colonial powers, the UK and 
Australia.  Tuvalu has added to these capital funds by savings from the royalties it obtains 
from other nations from their fishing in its waters. 
 
For most Pacific island countries, free trade in physical goods provides them with little 
economic gain because of the high transport costs and the natural imperfection of their local 
markets in the exchange of imported and exported goods.  In some cases, free trade regimes, 
promoted by the WTO, have even brought economic disadvantage.  For example, under the 
Lomé Convention and successive agreements, such as the Couteneau Agreement, Fiji had 
favoured access to the sugar market of the European Union (EU) and was able to sell its 
sugar at a price above the global free trade price.  In 2005, a WTO tribunal found that the 
EU’s protection of its sugar market breached WTO rules.  As a result, Fiji will obtain a less 
favourable price for its sugar exported to the EU.  Consequently, Fijian Indians renting sugar 
cane land from Indigenous Fijians could find it difficult to continue to pay existing levels of 
rents.  Lower sugar prices and uncertainty about prices may depress land rents in Fiji and 
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increase social tensions between Fijian Indians and Indigenous Fijians (Prasad and Tisdell, 
2006 forthcoming).   
 
This is not to say that Pacific islanders have not received any benefits from being a part of the 
world economy, but rather that freer international trade in goods is unlikely to have been very 
beneficial to them.  On the other hand, if globalisation extends to include access to overseas 
labour markets for Pacific islanders, it can bring substantial benefits to Pacific islanders by 
enabling many of them to earn higher incomes by working abroad and assisting financially 
those remaining at home by sending remittances to them. 
 
2.3 Geographic, ethnic and cultural differences 
Pacific island countries display considerable geographic, ethnic, and cultural diversity.  These 
variations can influence their compositive economic performance and their ability to benefit 
from economic globalisation. 
 
Differences in the physical geography of  South Pacific island countries results in 
considerable variation in their natural resource endowments and consequently, in their scope 
for international trade and exchange.  These endowments influence the composition of their 
exports, even though the exports of virtually all consist mainly of primary products. 
 
Some countries consist of coral atolls, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu and others are mainly 
volcanic, such as Fiji, Samoa and Tonga.  PNG is partly volcanic and partly continental, the 
Solomon Islands is mainly volcanic and the New Caledonia is principally continental.  Some 
countries have mixed landforms, consisting of some coral atoll islands and some volcanic 
ones, as in the case of the Solomon Islands.  Coral atoll countries have poor land resources.  
In these countries, agriculture is difficult and rich mineral resources are lacking; their main 
economic wealth is contained in their surrounding marine oceans.  In the case of atoll 
countries in the Pacific, their exclusive economic marine zones can be very large if they 
consist of scattered atolls as is the case for Kiribati and Tuvalu. 
 
While on the one hand, this dispersion of their land provides these countries with enhanced 
opportunities to earn rents form distant water fishing nations operating in their waters, this 
fragmentation of their land area adds to transport difficulties within these countries and 
reduces their ability to achieve economies of scale, for example, in the provision of public 
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utilities.  This is less of a problem for more compact countries such as Samoa, Tonga and Fiji 
than for very dispersed ones such as Kiribati and Tuvalu. 
 
Most small Pacific island countries are very vulnerable to natural disasters such as cyclones, 
exotic pests and tidal waves.  Whereas in a large country, e.g. Australia, such natural disasters 
are likely to leave a large part of it untouched, in small countries, all the country, or most of it, 
may be devastated and consequently, few internal resources may remain available to respond 
to the disaster. 
 
This, together with the other geographic and economic disadvantages of South Pacific island 
countries, suggest that they may not be an attractive destination for foreign private direct 
investment.  Easing of international capital flows may provide a greater stimulus for outflows 
of private capital from these countries than for inflows (Tisdell 2005).  This net outflow is 
likely to be increased in times when ethnic tensions create political uncertainty, as has 
happened in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, and in countries where law , order and governance 
are problematic, as in PNG.  Because of the risks involved, private investors are likely to seek 
a risk premium for investing in such countries. 
 
Considerable cultural and ethnic diversity exists between small South Pacific island countries.  
The populations of some are mainly Melanesian e.g. PNG and the Solomon Islands; others 
are Polynesian such as Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu and some others, are mainly Micronesian 
such as Kirabiti.  In the case of Fiji, nearly half of its population consists of the descendants 
of Indians.  Their culture is quite different to that of Indigenous Fijians.  Cultural differences 
and historical experiences seem to influence the extent to which these countries are able to 
achieve good governance, as judged from a Western perspective.  Whereas, Polynesian 
society is relatively stratified socially, with chiefly titles being inherited, in Melanesian 
society, political leadership is fluid and is based on the ‘Big Man’ concept.  Political leaders 
become leaders by their own social efforts and in return for support by their followers, must 
deliver goods and favours to them.  This may encourage corrupt practices, if judgement is 
based on Western social values.  
 
The first loyalty of indigenous Pacific islanders is usually to their own tribal group rather 
than to the ‘constructed’ nation to which they belong.  Communal systems of land ownership 
and control add to divisions and as do limits the ownership of land by those not belonging to 
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local island communities.  This discourages foreign direct investment in economic activities, 
such as tourism projects, requiring the use of native land. 
 
Furthermore, ethnic tensions are an obstacle to the smooth economic development of some 
Pacific island countries.  Examples include Fiji, where almost half the population is Indo-
Fijian and where changes in political control have resulted in coups by Indigenous Fijians 
(see Prasad and Tisdell, 2006), and the Solomon Islands where conflict between Malatians 
and non-Malatians in Honiara or Guadacanal has spasmodically resulted in rioting. 
 
Poor governance, problems involving land rights and political instability tend to encourage 
private capital outflows and reduce foreign direct investment in the countries concerned.  
This means that the often touted benefit of globalisation for encouraging greater foreign 
direct investment fails to materialize for those economies. 
 
On the other hand, one can understand why many islanders, who depend heavily on 
subsistence incomes, guard their land ownership and sea rights.  Many Pacific islanders may 
favour a communal economic approach to living because sharing by members of the 
extended family and tribal groups provides social security (Tisdell, 1990, Ch.9).  Such an 
approach is likely to be especially favoured in remote communities where outside help can be 
difficult to obtain. 
 
2.4  International political associations 
The international political affiliations of Pacific island countries have largely been 
determined by their previous historical connections.  All have been subject to colonial rule.  
They may be divided into these groups:  
1. Former British, including Australia and New Zealand colonies, such as Fiji, PNG, the 
Solomon  Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati and Tuvalu;  
2. Countries affiliated with the USA such as the Marshall Island, Palau, American 
Samoa, and 
3. Those belonging to France: French Polynesia and New Caledonia. 
Vanuatu maintains a weak connection with France in view of the fact that Vanuatu was 
jointly administered by the UK and France. 
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These connections are important in influencing foreign aid and the perceived financial social 
responsibilities of countries like Australia and New Zealand, and of France in meeting their 
obligations towards small Pacific island countries. 
 
2.5  Differences in the extent of economic development of Pacific island countries 
The way in which one judges the extent of the economic development of a country depends 
to a considerable extend on value judgements.  Westerners may judge this for example, by 
the extent to which a nation’s economy relies on market exchange and the extent to which it 
is a monetary economy.  Using this approach, many Pacific island economies are lacking in 
economic development because a large proportion of their production is used for subsistence 
and they are not involved to a significant extent in market exchange.  Even in the case of Fiji, 
which has a relatively well developed exchange economy, many of its commodities for 
consumption are self-provided by households, particularly on the outer islands.  In the 
Solomon Islands, the subsistence sector is relatively more important than in Fiji. 
 
Many islanders do not require cash to obtain most of their regular consumption items, but it is 
needed to purchase consumer durables and some products only supplied by the cash economy.  
Cash for these purposes may come from remittances of family members working abroad, 
remittances from family members working in the government bureaucracy or in business, or 
from occasional sales of produce such as coconuts, kava roots, for cash.  The cash earnings of 
one family member is usually shared amongst many family members. 
 
On the one hand, the heavy dependence of many Pacific islanders on subsistence income 
suggests that the exchange economy and international exchange are not very important for 
their welfare.  On the other hand, the cash income of Pacific islanders, even if small, enables 
them to buy commodities for which there are no subsistence substitutes, or only poor ones.  
Thus, the relative value to Pacific islanders of cash income may be much greater than its 
proportion of their total income. 
 
3.  The MIRAB Paradigm of Pacific Island Economies and Globalisation Processes 
In the 1980s, Bertram and Watters (1985, 1986) characterised South Pacific micro-states as 
MIRAB economics.  That is as economies relying on overseas migration (MI) which in turn 
generates remittances (R) for their residents and foreign aid (A) used to support their 
government bureaucracies (B) (see also Bertram, 1985, McKee and Tisdell, 1990, Ch.7, 
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Tisdell, 1990, Ch.10).  The representation of Bertram and Watters was particularly apt for 
small Pacific island countries associated with New Zealand because of the relative freedom 
of entry of their residents to New Zealand.  This included countries such as Samoa and Tonga.  
It was less relevant to those South Pacific countries, the residents of which lacked easy out 
migration to more developed countries in the Pacific Rim.  This, for example, included 
countries such as Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu and PNG.  However, even for 
many of these countries, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, remittances were important.  In the case 
of the two countries last mentioned, remittances from their merchant seamen working on 
overseas vessels were important.  Furthermore, remittances have increased in importance for 
Fiji as many Indo-Fijians are migrating abroad. 
 
With growing globalisation, the migration and remittance component of the MIRAB model 
has increased in relative importance for many South Pacific island countries.  However, 
excluding the French possessions in the Pacific such as French Polynesia, the extent of 
overseas aid for South Pacific island states has fallen.  Furthermore, aid has become more 
conditional in Australia’s case on the recipients promoting good governance.  Thus, Australia 
has intervened directly in the Solomon Islands to secure law and order and in PNG, Australia 
is involved in reform of PNG’s police force with a view to eliminating corruption. 
 
Reduced foreign aid for South Pacific countries is in fact based upon a renewed faith in the 
power of economic liberalism and market forces to bring about economic development in a 
global setting (Tisdell et al., 2004).  This view is fostered by the Washington consensus that 
economic growth is likely to be most rapid when the government sector is small and the 
management of economies is left mainly to free market forces, including global market forces.  
Bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank have consistently subscribed to this view in 
recent times. 
 
However, this view has its limitations, particularly as far as small island Pacific countries are 
concerned.  Market transaction costs reduce the economic value of market extension for these 
economies.  This is especially so because they are vulnerable to natural monopolies in their 
own markets.  Often the Washington consensus is supported by the assertion that government 
expenditure and investment crowds out private investment.  However, there is scant evidence 
that public investment is a strong substitute for private investment.  In particular, public 
investment in infrastructure can be highly complementary with private investment. 
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 Some economic advisors to Pacific island countries have led them to believe that by carrying 
out market reforms and having a lean public sector, they will encourage foreign direct 
investments and stimulate economic growth.  However, there is little evidence to support this 
point of view.  For example, although Fiji has carried out many economic reforms and 
established a more open economy, it has experienced falling levels of investment in 
proportion to its GDP in recent times.  In Fiji, both public investment and private investment 
as a percentage of GDP have fallen in the period 1980-2000 (Tisdell, 2005; Prasad and 
Tisdell, 2006 forthcoming).  While a part of the reason has been the political uncertainty 
generated by coups in Fiji, it is possible that returns on capital have been higher overseas than 
in Fiji.  With fewer restrictions on capital movements, investable funds have moved away 
from Fiji in response to higher returns on capital overseas. 
 
The MIRAB model is furthermore becoming less relevant to Pacific island countries because 
foreign aid to these countries is falling.  Thus there is less aid to support the government 
bureaucracies of small Pacific island nations.  However, many of their governments have 
introduced value added taxes (VAT or GST).  This provides their government indirectly with 
income from remittances from overseas when these are spent by recipients on commodities in 
these economies. 
 
Although aid in the form of grants is becoming less common, many Pacific island countries 
still have substantial development loans.  Even when such loans are given on concessional 
terms, they do impose a long-term economic obligation upon borrowers.  If the returns on the 
investments made with the loans are insufficiently high, they create an economic burden for 
borrowers.  It is an open question whether government bureaucrats pursue their own self-
interest in negotiating such loans.  An agency problem exists (McGuigan et al., 2002, pp.16-
17).  This is because on the one hand, such loans usually expand the size of government 
bureaucracies (government bureaucrats can indirectly be significant beneficiaries) but on the 
other hand, these loans have to be repaid from taxes collected from the general public. 
 
The level of external debt as a percentage of their Gross National Product (GNI) or GDP 
(depending on available data) are shown for South Pacific island countries in Table 3.  These 
figures range from a low of 5.6% of GDP in the case of Kiribati to a high of 138% of GNI in 
the case of Samoa.  Almost half the countries listed have an external debt exceeding half of 
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their GNI or GDP.   Some of the countries with the lowest per capita levels of income, such 
as PNG and the Solomon Islands, are in the most indebted group. 
 
Table 3: External debt of Pacific Island countries as a percentage of their GNI or GDP 
for the years indicated. 
Country Year %GNI 
Cook Islands 2002 55.6 
Fiji 2003 13.5 
Kiribati 2001 5.6* 
Marshall Islands 2001 77.6* 
Micronesia 2002 24.2* 
Palau 2002 26.9* 
PNG 2003 89.9 
Samoa 2003 138 
Solomon Islands 2002 75.3 
Tonga 2003 52.1 
Tuvalu 2002 33.4* 
Vanuatu 2003 33.9 
Note: * percentage of GDP 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Country Reports, Key Indicators (www.adb.org), accessed July 2006. 
 
Given the high degree of external indebtedness of some Pacific island countries, they run the 
risk of not being able to service their loans if their earnings from abroad suddenly decline.  
For some it is also possible that servicing their external debt could eventually become a 
barrier to their long-term economic development.  Loans are not grants or gifts.  In this era of 
liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation, grants are becoming rarer.  Consequently, it is 
becoming less relevant to typify Pacific island economies as aid economies, the French 
territories excepted. 
 
4.  Globalisation and the Sustainable Development of South Pacific Island Countries. 
A major question is whether the resources of the Pacific island countries are adequate to 
enable them to reach the same or similar level of per capita income as more developed 
countries.  There is no reason to believe that this is the case.  On average, income potentials 
and economic opportunities seem to be less in these economies than in more developed 
countries.  The residents of these countries have strong economic incentives for emigration, 
especially if they are highly qualified and skilled residents.  The governments of these small 
island countries would like to have greater opportunities for their people to work abroad.  
Amongst other things, remittances from those working abroad provide economic support for 
their mother countries.  Emigration and remittances are to some extent an alternative to 
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foreign aid intended to raise the incomes of South Pacific countries by investment and 
economic development (see Tisdell, 1990, Ch.10). 
 
However, aid may be an inefficient economic alternative to migration because the return on 
aid monies invested in many of these small island economies may be low, or even negative.  
Furthermore, economic globalisation involving more liberal commodity and capital markets 
but not extending to free international movements of labour also seems insufficient to bring 
about substantial economic growth in many of these economies.  However, the Australian 
Coalition Government in power in 2006 opposes easier migration to Australia from the South 
Pacific island countries arguing that they should develop their own countries.  For many, the 
latter appears to be a ‘tall order’ and they are disadvantaged because economic globalisation 
is partial.  It is interesting to note that even the World Bank (2004, p.11) has become 
supportive of easier international mobility of labour. 
 
It should also be noted that with more liberal economic markets and changing dynamic 
conditions, some regions of the world and regions within nations decline and others grow.  
Thus growing urbanisation is occurring in many Pacific island countries and outer islands and 
areas of some countries are having falling populations (McKee and Tisdell, 1990).  With 
easier international labour movements, it is possible that the level of population of some 
Pacific island countries could fall as a result of migration.  Nevertheless, it is normal in larger 
countries for the populations in some regions to decline and to increase in others.  Why 
should Pacific islanders find it economic to stay in the country where they were born? 
 
Many Pacific island countries have dual economies comprised of a subsistence or semi-
subsistence sector and of a commercial market sector.  Their commercial sector is not very 
diversified and could become less so with growing globalisation.  This is because, in view of 
the law of comparative economic advantage, free trade fosters specialisation in production 
and international exchange by countries.  While this can promote economic efficiency, lack 
of economic diversification, adds to economic risk. (Tisdell and Fairbairn, 1984). 
 
Another important issue is whether South Pacific islanders should abandon subsistence 
activities and adopt completely a commercial market economic system.  Most Western 
economists might think such a transition is socially desirable.  However, institutional barriers, 
such as tribal control of land ownership, hamper such a transition.  Furthermore, taking into 
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account market transaction costs and the economic security of villagers such a transition is 
unlikely to be universally desirable (see for example Fisk and Shand, 1970; Tisdell and 
Fairbairn, 1984; Tisdell, 1990, Ch.9).  Transition is even less desirable if it is forced by 
foreign bodies, such as Bretton Woods institutions, rather than allowed to evolve naturally.  
The latter is in fact the more liberal approach. 
 
The economic wealth of South Pacific island countries lies mainly in their natural resources, 
and those are their main sources for earning foreign exchange.  The ways in which these 
resources are exploited have important implications for the sustainability of their economies.  
Some Pacific island nations have depended or now depend on, exploitation of non-renewable 
mineral resources to a large extent, and most have large degree of dependence on living 
natural resources, such as fisheries.  These resources are renewable but can also be depleted if 
over utilised.  With a huge market demand for such resources in a global economy, there is 
always a risk that these resources will be exploited at a higher and faster rate than is desirable.  
For example, the forests of the Solomon Islands and PNG have experienced timber harvesting 
on an unsustainable basis and there is a risk of tuna stocks being over exploited in the Pacific 
by distant water fishing nations.  In the past, countries such as Nauru and Kiribati have had 
their only important mineral deposit, phosphate, completely mined out.  Although British 
authorities provided some compensatory funds after the event to the countries concerned, 
Nauru now faces considerable economic difficulties because of unwise investment of these 
funds.  Problems faced by Nauru have been, for example, highlighted by McDaniel and 
Gowdy (2000, Ch.2).  Kiribati has fared better in that regard. 
 
Mineral exploitation in the Pacific islands has been a controversial matter.  In the Solomon 
Islands, opposition to a copper mine by villagers resulted in civil war, and BHP’s Ok Tedi 
mine in  PNG cause considerable environmental damage along the Fly River (Tisdell, 1997) 
and was forced to close down.  As outlined by Tisdell, (1990,Ch.2), institutional mechanisms 
of globalisation ‘desensitize’ investors to local concerns and issues, for example, 
shareholders in multinational companies. 
 
Again, there is a high risk that some Pacific island atoll countries will be obliterated by global 
warming and the predicted rise in sea levels.  Tuvalu and Kiribati are at particular risk.  This 
can be viewed as a side-effect of global economic growth and is  associated with increased 
emissions of greenhouse gasses. 
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 5.  Concluding Comments 
South Pacific island countries are diverse geographically in their cultures and in their ethnic 
composition.  On the other hand, they have a number of common features: all have small 
internal markets; all experience substantial transaction costs in accessing world markets; all 
are vulnerable to natural hazards and in varying degrees, to market-related hazards; and in all 
cases, structural conditions hinder the establishment of relatively competitive markets.  Their 
ability to gain from economic globalisation is limited.  Their main avenue to gain from 
economic globalisation would appear to be by easier international labour movements, but 
liberalisation of such movements has been slower than for goods and capital. 
 
While, in the past, many of the South Pacific island economies have been well characterised 
as MIRAB economies, the aid component of this characterisation appears to have become of 
reduced importance, except for the French Pacific territories (French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia).  This reduction in aid is a consequence of the globally dominant view, reflected 
in the Washington Consensus, that economic liberalism, privatisation and globalisation are 
the keys to overcoming economic disadvantage.  However, this policy prescription, 
particularly in the case of small island countries in the Pacific, is not a panacea if 
international movements of labour are significantly restricted.1
 
6. Notes 
1. More information about the least developed island countries in the Pacific can be 
found in Economics and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2006 Part II) 
and in Tisdell (2000a,b,c,d,e). 
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